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In many developed countries ageing has led to a debate on reforming unfunded pay-as-you-go
(PAYG) social-security systems. One of the most discussed reform proposals is to switch to
a more funded pension system where people save for their own pensions, and realise a higher
expected rate of return on their contributions (see for example Feldstein (2005)). Many
countries with PAYG-ﬁnanced pension schemes actually (are planning to) implement such
pension reforms. In a multicountry world with integrated capital markets, this switch to
funding will engender spillover eﬀects to other countries. The aim of this paper is to look
at these international spillover eﬀects of pension reform. More speciﬁcally, we will analyse
how countries with funded pension systems are aﬀected when countries with PAYG pension
schemes reform their pension system.
Some papers (e.g. Fehr et al. (2003), B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2003) and INGENUE (2001)) that
address pension reform issues in an open-economy framework develop large multi-country
overlapping-generation models to study the eﬀects of pension reform. These large-scale gen-
eral equilibrium models are particularly useful in case one wants to obtain reliable forecasts
on several key economic variables. An important drawback of these models is, however, that
analytical solutions are not feasible. We use a simple two-country two-period overlapping-
generations model with an integrated capital market, where one country has a PAYG pension
system and the other country has a fully funded retirement scheme. By keeping the model
this simple, we are able to derive an analytical solution for the transition path of the common
capital-labour ratio. Other variables, like consumption and utility, can be derived from the
development of the capital-labour ratio.
In analysing the eﬀects of a pension reform in the PAYG country, we ﬁrst assume that
collecting contributions in the PAYG country does not involve any distortions. It is well-
known that in such a case the PAYG system is Pareto eﬃcient, see Verbon (1989) and Breyer
(1989). That means that in case, e.g., a conversion policy goes along with a compensation for
the elderly, ﬁnanced by public debt, the gains of future generations are at best neutralized or,
worse, turned into losses by the higher future taxes needed to service the debt. On the other
2hand, if future generations are allowed to gain from the conversion policy, it is unavoidable
that current generations have to incur a loss. So, in the reforming country a choice has to be
made which generations are allowed to gain from the reform and which not. One conclusion
that will emerge from our two-country model is that in a common capital market this choice
spills over to the other non-reforming country. In particular, if the reforming country decides
that future generations will gain from the reform, future generations in the non-reforming
country will gain as well.
We then proceed by assuming excess burdens in tax collection. In that case it has been shown
that a Pareto-improving pension reform is possible (Homburg (1990)). The idea is that if the
contribution rate is decreased net welfare gains are incurred which make it possible to com-
pensate the elderly for the loss of their beneﬁts. Additional features for implementing a Pareto
improvement can be added. Pemberton (2000) and Belan et al. (1998) assume externalities
in production on top of excess burdens in taxation, and K¨ othenb¨ urger and Poutvaara (2005)
assume an increase in the value of a ﬁxed factor that goes along with a decrease of taxation.
These additional features, however, though making it more likely, are not necessary for reach-
ing a Pareto-improving conversion. Therefore, we will restrict ourselves to assuming excess
burdens resulting from taxation only. Let us note that we merely conclude that the existence
of an excess burden oﬀers the scope for introducing a Pareto-improving reform. However, we
do not go into the issue here whether this is a ’good’ or ’bad’ reason for reform1.
The excess burden of taxation has been modelled in at least two ways in the literature.
Homburg (1990) and Breyer and Straub (1993) assume that taxes distort the labour-leisure
decision so that a decrease in the contribution rate for the PAYG system will increase labour
supply, and, therefore, restrict the loss in revenue for ﬁnancing the pension beneﬁts. Pember-
1It should be noted here that the existence of excess burdens in taxation cannot be the prime motive for
converting the PAYG system into a fully funded system. The excess burden arises because the individual
link between pension beneﬁts and contributions is broken. The reason for this is that the pension system is
also used for intragenerational redistribution. As proved by Fenge (1995) and Brunner (1996), in a PAYG
system in which such a link exists the system is Pareto eﬃcient, even if contributions are a proportional tax on
labour income. Such PAYG systems exist. For instance, as noted by Sinn (2000), Germany has had a PAYG
system since 1957 where beneﬁts are proportional to contributions, and so a Pareto improving transition to a
funded system is not possible in Germany. Sinn (2000) and Belan and Pestieau (1999) give overviews of the
issue. Their conclusion in the words of the last authors is that ”reduced distortions can be achieved without
privatization”.
3ton (2000), however, considers the case where a conversion policy goes along with an income
tax being replaced by a consumption tax. Then young individuals under the conversion policy
have an incentive to save more than under the income tax, which provides the means to com-
pensate the older generations when the PAYG system is abolished. Analogously, Belan et al.
(1998) oﬀers the ﬁrst generation a subsidy on the return on its savings. Our speciﬁcation will
be more in line with the ﬁrst type of modelling (labour-supply eﬀects), but our model allows
the introduction of the second type (savings incentives) just as well.
Given that taxes imply an excess burden in the PAYG-country, we implement a Pareto-
improving policy in our two-country world. It appears again that the long-run gains in
the PAYG-country are transferred to the funded country. However, although in the PAYG-
country the policy is carefully shaped such that no generation loses in both the short run
and the long run, in the funded country some generations might lose in the short run. The
reason for this is that in the open capital market the additional savings that emerge during the
conversion policy in the PAYG country will depress the interest rate, and especially harms the
generations that are alive in the funded country when the PAYG country starts the conversion
policy. As these generations do not, or do not fully, incur the gains that result from increasing
wages, they are not able to compensate themselves against the negative utility eﬀects of the
lower interest rate.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the benchmark model and
shows how the pension reform is modelled. In Section 3 we analyse diﬀerent types of reform
scenarios under the assumption that the PAYG scheme is Pareto eﬃcient. While Section 4
considers the eﬀects in case the reform is Pareto improving in the PAYG country. The ﬁnal
section concludes.
2 The model
We will use a two-period overlapping-generations model of an open economy. Following Buiter
(1981) and Persson (1985), the world consists of two countries, country P and country F.
The only diﬀerence between the two countries is the way the pensions are ﬁnanced. Country
4P uses a pay-as-you-go (PAYG) system and country F has a fully funded retirement scheme.
The countries are identical in all other respects2. We assume a constant population size and
dynamic eﬃciency in both countries.
2.1 Production
Production per young individual is described by a standard neoclassical constant-returns-
to-scale production function, f(ki
t), where ki
t stands for the amount of capital per young
individual in period t in country i, i = P, F. Perfect competition among producers gives the







t is the interest
rate, wi
t denotes the real wage, and δ is the depreciation rate of capital. There is perfect
capital mobility between the two countries, but labour is immobile. Since capital can freely
move across countries, the interest rates will be equalised, i.e., rP
t = rF
t = rt, ∀t. And because






2.2 Modelling pensions and reform
Initially the government in country P runs a balanced PAYG pension system, that is, taxes
of the young (τP
t ) are used to ﬁnance the pension beneﬁts of the elderly (zP
t ). As explained
in the introduction we distinguish between the case where the PAYG system is eﬃcient and
the case where the PAYG scheme leads to distortions in the economy. In the latter case
the PAYG tax implies an excess burden. Instead of explicitly specifying how behaviour is
aﬀected when the excess burden of the premium contributions is lifted, we assume that the
tax base is constant and independent of the size of the contribution. The existence of an
excess burden under the PAYG system is modelled by assuming that for a given tax imposed
on young individuals, only τP
t − (τP
t )2 can be redistributed, so (τP
t )2 is ’wasted’ (see Perotti
(2001) who uses an analogous speciﬁcation). For a tax on elderly individuals, however, such
a waste does not occur. This speciﬁcation of the excess burden of the tax is thus a short
cut for the labour-supply interpretation. Regarding this interpretation, it should be the case,
2So we assume both economies to be of equal size. The model is easily generalized to allow for scale
diﬀerences between the two countries. This does not qualitatively change our results, however.
5as we assume, that taxing the young leads to tax revenue losses if the young curtail their
labour-supply eﬀorts as a result of the tax. But, when the elderly are retired, taxes cannot
have an eﬀect on their labour-supply behaviour, and so, there is no excess burden.
In general, in the initial steady state the pension beneﬁts of the elderly are equal to3:
zP = τP − ξ(τP)2 (1)
where ξ = 1 implies that the PAYG tax leads to an excess burden, and where ξ = 0 refers to
the situation where the ﬁnancing of the PAYG scheme is not distortionary. For the moment
we develop the model in the absence of distortions so that ξ = 0 and zP = τP in the initial
steady state. In Section 4 we consider the case where ξ = 1.
At t = −1 the government in country P announces that it will reform its pension system
in the next period (t = 0). Individuals take the economic consequences of the reform into
account when they make their optimising decisions in period t = −1. A pension reform leads
to a lower contribution level and lower beneﬁts. We model this as follows:
τP
t = µt τP (2)
zP
t = λt τP (3)
where µt < 1 and λt ≤ 1.
One of the crucial issues in pension reform is whether or not the (partial or complete) switch
to funding is accompanied by a compensation for the older generations. We consider both
possibilities. In the ﬁrst case there is no compensation: beneﬁts and contributions simulta-
neously decrease by the same amount. The elderly individuals at the time of the reform lose
as a consequence, while the current and future young individuals fully gain from the higher
rate of return on their contributions under the funded system.
In the second case the elderly are compensated, implying that µt < λt will hold during the
initial periods of the reform. We assume that public debt, (bP
t ), is used to ﬁnance the shortfall
3By omitting time subscripts we denote the initial steady state value of the respective variable.
6in contributions. It is assumed that the government issues one-period debt, which yields the
same rate of interest as capital. At a later stage, additional contributions (τB
t ) are raised to
ﬁnance the interest obligations on the debt, so as to keep debt per worker constant. With
debt, therefore, the budget constraint of the government (public debt dynamics) in per capita
terms is:
bP





If part of the beneﬁts are ﬁnanced by government debt, we assume that at a certain point in
time beneﬁts match contributions again, i.e. the beneﬁts should have decreased as: λt = µt <
1. So the PAYG system is balanced again, but at a permanently lower level. Furthermore,
we assume that there is no government debt in the initial steady state (bP = 0), so that τB
is zero too.
In country F the government invests the contributions of the young (τF
t ) and returns them
with interest in the next period in the form of transfers to the then old agents (zF
t+1)4:
zF
t+1 = (1 + rt+1)τF
t (5)
2.3 Households






















where ρ > 0 stands for the (constant) pure rate of time preference of an individual, c
y,i
t is
consumption when young, and c
o,i
t+1 is consumption in the second period of life.
Young agents inelastically supply one unit of labour. The consolidated lifetime budget con-
4We assume that in country F the contribution τ
F
t does not imply an excess burden, due to the system
being actuarially fair for every individual.













































The government in country P can either levy τB
t on the elderly (eq. (7a)) or on the working
people (eq. (7b)). Maximizing lifetime utility with respect to the lifetime budget constraints












































Note that optimal savings in country F do not depend on the interest rate. The reason for
this is that with logarithmic utility, the intertemporal substitution elasticity is equal to one.
For the same reason, optimal savings in country P only react to the interest rate because it
changes the net present value of the pension beneﬁt (and taxes possibly paid in the second
period of life).
2.4 Equilibrium international capital market
Individuals invest their savings either in their own country or abroad, their portfolios will
be composed such that interest rates are equalised. Equilibrium in the international capital




t = 2kt+1 + bP
t+1 (11)
8From equations (9) and (10) it can be seen that country F has higher savings than country
P, implying that country F exports capital abroad.
3 Pension reform under Pareto eﬃciency
This section investigates the spillover eﬀects of a pension reform in the PAYG country, under
the assumption that the PAYG system is Pareto eﬃcient, i.e. taxes are non distortionary. We
consider three diﬀerent types of reforms. In the ﬁrst reform, the government in the PAYG
country does not compensate the elderly at the time of the reform (Section 3.1). In the second
and third reform we analyse the eﬀects in case the government fully compensates the current
old. In that case government debt is created and the extra tax needed to pay the interest
obligations on the debt can either be levied on the pensioners (Section 3.2) or on the working
people (Section 3.3).
For all cases considered we are able to calculate analytically the eﬀect of a pension reform on
the common capital stock. We employ the method of comparative dynamics, adopted from
Judd (1982). The processes for µt and λt are given by:
µt = 1 + πgt (12)
λt = 1 + πft (13)
where gt < 0 and ft ≤ 0 describe the time pattern of a perturbation of µt and λt from
their steady-state values and π reﬂects the magnitude of this perturbation. The eﬀects of
a pension reform can be traced by linearising the capital-accumulation equation (11) with
respect to π around the initial steady state. The resulting ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equations for
kt describe the capital-labour ratio changes over time and the determining factors. Moreover,
we produce numerical simulations in order to illustrate the mechanics of the model. The
qualitative results of these simulations are robust for changes in the adopted values of the
parameters5.
5We derived numerically the non-linear transition path, and compared the numerical results with those
93.1 No compensation for the current old
At t = −1 the government announces that it will decrease both the contributions to the
PAYG system (τP
t ) and the pension beneﬁts (zP
t ) permanently in the next period (t = 0)6.
So the old at t = 0 bear all the costs of the reform.
The change in the capital-labour ratio
Using the method described above we obtain the following ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation for















with ∆ ≡ 2(2 + ρ) −
(1+ρ)zPf00(k)
(1+r)2 > 0.
Equation (14) shows the change in the capital-labour ratio after a pension reform in country
P when the two economies have a joint capital market. To analyse the international spillover
eﬀects we derive the same kind of equations for the situation where the two economies are
closed. In country F nothing happens when it is a closed economy, because it is not reforming

















with ∆P ≡ (2 + ρ) −
(1+ρ)zPf00(k)
(1+r)2 > 0. Notice the diﬀerence with equation (14): in that
equation the nominator of the ﬁrst term and the ﬁrst term of ∆ are multiplied by 2. So
∆P < ∆, which implies that for a given pension reform, that is, for a given process for gt and
ft+1 the change in the capital-labour ratio is larger in case country P does not have capital
mobility with country F.
The spillovers follow from comparing the change in the variables in the open-economies case
found with the method of comparative dynamics. The accuracy of the linearised path was quite satisfactory
with a relative error of one percent at most. This is in line with the ﬁndings by Meijdam and Verhoeven (1998).
They conclude that using comparative dynamics in a dynamic model is just as accurate as using comparative
statics in a static model.
6This means that g0 = g1 = ... = g∞ < 0 and ft = gt < 0. This could either be a full privatisation
(gt = ft = −1) or a partial privatisation (−1 < gt = ft < 0).
7In Appendix A we show the derivation of this expression.
10with the closed-economies case. Considering the eﬀects of pension reform in a closed economy
has the same eﬀect as assuming that the two countries have a PAYG system. Because we want
to focus solely on the international spillover eﬀects when the two countries have integrated
capital markets before the pension reform, we assume that the amount of capital in the initial
steady state is the same when both countries have a PAYG system (closed-economy case)
and when they have diﬀerent pension systems (so that equation (14) holds). By comparing
the capital-labour ratio changes in case the two countries have the same pension system (eq.
(15)) with the change in the capital-labour ratio when the two countries have diﬀerent pension
schemes (eq. (14)), we derive the pure spillover eﬀects of pension reform in a common capital
market.
From equation (14) it follows that, in case of a joint capital market, the reform leads to a
positive change in the capital-labour ratio at t = 0, as ∂k0
∂π = −
(1+ρ)τP
∆(1+r) f0 > 0. The reason for
this is that at the time of the announcement (t = −1), young individuals living in country P
decide to increase their savings because they know they will receive a lower pension beneﬁt
when they are old.
The increase in the common capital-labour ratio at t = 0 leads to higher wages, which
engenders higher savings in both countries. Due to these higher savings the capital-labour
ratio continues to rise (the ﬁrst term in eq. (14)).
Citizens in the PAYG country have an additional incentive to save more, because, as of
from t = 0 contributions to the PAYG system fall (second term in eq. (14)), and they will
receive lower beneﬁts. When the two countries have a common capital market part of these
extra savings ﬂow to country F, so that the capital-labour ratio in country P increases less
compared to the closed economy case. This can also be seen in Figure 1 in Appendix C.1
where we show the change in the capital-labour ratio for both closed and open economies.
The change in consumption and utility
When we know the change in the capital-labour ratio we can derive the changes in all other
variables. The analytical derivations do not produce any additional insight, however. There-
fore we only show simulation graphs. The change in consumption when young in the two
11countries is displayed in Figures 4 and 6. As explained, individuals in country P and born
at t = −1 save more, therefore their consumption when young decreases. For individuals
born at t = 0 wages will go up and taxes go down, so that their consumption when young
increases. Wages rise more when the PAYG country is closed, so c
y,P
t increases more in that
case. It might be emphasized here that as the reform in country P implies an increasing
capital-labour ratio and higher wages, the consumption possibilities for the young in country
F are also enhanced.
Figures 5 and 7 show the change in old-age consumption. Obviously, the fall in pension
beneﬁts and the lower return on savings cause the consumption of old people living in country
P at t = 0 to decrease. Because wages and savings increase over time, c
o,P
t increases from
t = 1 onwards. If country P is closed, the initial decreases of the interest rates will be stronger
than if country P is open. The elderly will, therefore, be hurt more. After three periods,
however, the stronger wage eﬀect in the closed economy will lead to a stronger increase in
old-age consumption.
The fall in the interest rate at t = 0 also lowers the return of the savings of old people living
in country F, therefore their old-age consumption falls at t = 0. In the period after the shock
the increased savings in the previous period are not enough to oﬀset the further decrease in
the interest rate, so that consumption of the old decreases more. Notice that while in the
long run elderly in country P see their consumption increase due to the reform, the elderly
in the non-reform country F get less consumption possibilities.
The changes in lifetime utility are shown in Figures 2 and 3. This type of pension reform, in
which beneﬁts are decreased without compensation, will obviously hurt the elderly in country
P at the time of the reform. It is, however, interesting to note that this loss spills over to the
elderly in country F as well. Even stronger, the young generation in country F at the time
of the reform, t = 0, experiences a loss, while this is not the case for the young generation in
country P at t = 0. Later generations in country F gain from the pension reform in country
P, but the consumption gap between young and old people has increased.
123.2 Compensation: tax levied on the future old
In the pension reform described in the previous section the current elderly bear all the costs
of the reform. It is probably more realistic to assume that the government compensates
the current old, so that individuals have more time to adjust their behaviour to the smaller
PAYG system. Therefore, in this and the next subsection we assume that while contributions
to the PAYG scheme fall permanently at t = 0, beneﬁts are kept constant in that period.
This is again communicated one period before the reform actually takes place (at t = −1).
The government also announces that at t = 1 pension beneﬁts will fall as much as the
contributions, so that the PAYG system is balanced again from then on8. Since taxes are
lower than the beneﬁts during one period (t = 0), there will be government debt in country
P at t = 1. At the moment that contributions and beneﬁts are equal again (t = 1), the
government introduces an extra tax (τB
t ) to pay the interest obligations on its debt, such that
debt per worker is stabilised from then on. This extra tax can either be levied on the working
people or on the elderly. In this subsection we analyse the eﬀects when τB
t is levied on the
elderly, starting at t = 1. In that case the pension reform is Pareto neutral, that is, there is
no generation that gains or loses from the pension reform.
We ﬁnd the following ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation for the change in the capital-labour ratio



























where ∆ has the same deﬁnition as in the previous subsection. Comparing this equation






∂π , because of the
government debt created to compensate the old at t = 0. As can be seen debt has a direct
negative impact on the change in the capital-labour ratio. However, because τB
t is levied on
the pensioners, they will increase their savings when young which has a positive eﬀect on the
8This means that g0 = g1 = ... = g∞ < 0 and f0 = 0, ft = gt < 0 for t > 0.




























∂π , implying that gt = ft. At the same time an extra tax is introduced to












In Appendix B.1 we show that with this pension reform scenario the capital-labour ratio
remains constant. This implies that consumption and utility also do not change. Moreover,
there are no international spillover eﬀects for the funded country. The reason for these results
is that with this reform savings in the PAYG country increase exactly by the same amount
as the government debt. All that has happened is that the implicit debt of the PAYG system
has been made explicit. This is a standard result in the pension reform literature, see for
example Verbon (1989), Breyer (1989) and Homburg (1990).
3.3 Compensation: tax levied on the future young
Instead of imposing τB
t on the elderly, the government can also levy the tax on the working



























As can be seen this equation looks almost the same as equation (16), the only diﬀerence is
that τB
t now has a negative impact on the change in the capital-labour ratio. Notice, however,
that the ﬁrst young generation under the reform, born at t = 0, does not have to pay the debt
tax, i.e. τB
0 = 0. Like the future young generations, they get the lower PAYG tax, but, unlike
the future young generations, they do not have to contribute to the compensation the elderly
at t = 0 receive. The young generation at t = 0, therefore, will get a windfall gain. As a
14result, the capital-labour ratio will decrease at t = 1, as ∂k1
∂π =
(1+ρ)τPr
∆(1+r) g0 < 0, see Appendix
B.2 for the derivation. The intuition for this result is obvious. The ﬁrst young generation
under the reform consumes part of its gain in the ﬁrst period, and saves part of it. As the
gain this generation receives equals the created debt, the increase in savings at t = 0 is lower
than the created debt, and part of the debt has to be ﬁnanced by savings that, without the
reform policy, would have been available for ﬁnancing the capital stock. In other words, the
public debt crowds out part of the capital stock.
At t = 1 the working generation gets the lower PAYG tax again, but this generation also
starts contributing to the stabilisation of the debt by paying a debt tax τB
t . Moreover, they
inherit a lower capital-labour ratio, which leads to lower wages. Therefore, the gap between
savings and the created debt will even more widen compared to t = 0. The government debt
will crowd out a larger part of the capital stock and, as a result, the capital-labour ratio and
the wage rate continue to decline. Because country P can ﬁnance part of its government debt
with savings of country F in case of open economies, the capital-labour ratio falls more when
country P does not have integrated capital markets with country F. This can be seen in
Figure 8 in Appendix C.2.
Notice that the results of this reform are exactly the opposite of the pension reform described
in Section 3.1: the capital-labour ratio falls over time instead of rises. This implies that the
eﬀect on the other endogenous variables is also reversed. Actually, all simulation graphs are
almost the mirror images of those of the pension reform in Section 3.1, the peaks are only one
period later, because young individuals in the PAYG country do not adjust their behaviour
at t = −1. This means that the pension reform in country P leads to less consumption
possibilities for the young in country F (Figure 13), while the elderly in this country gain
(Figure 14). At the time of the reform the young in country P gain from the lower tax, which
enables them to get a higher return than they would have obtained under the unchanged
PAYG tax (Figure 9). All next generations in both country P and country F however,
experience a lower wage, which makes them the losers of this reform policy (Figures 9 and 10).
However, the fact that they form a monetary union with country F protects the generations
15living in country P to some extent, as part of the burden of this reform policy is transmitted
to country F via the capital market.
3.4 Concluding remarks
It is well known that when the PAYG system is Pareto eﬃcient, a pension reform can only
lead to gains for some generations, if at least one generation incurs losses. If no generation has
to be made worse oﬀ, the best a reform can lead to is making the implicit debt inherent to a
PAYG system explicit. In our two-country model this implies that there are no spillover eﬀects
for the funded country. However, when the government in the PAYG country implements a
reform that leads to gains and losses for at least one generation, these gains and losses will be
transmitted to the funded country via the capital market. In particular, when at the start of
the pension reform the elderly are not allowed to lose, future generations will lose when one
(or more) early generations under the reform will get a (windfall) gain. The losses of future
generations will occur in both the PAYG country and the country with the funded pension
scheme. On the other hand, when the ﬁrst generation is losing under the reform policy, future
generations in both countries will gain.
The pension reforms analysed in this section are extreme, in the sense that no compensation
at all or full compensation is granted at the time of the reform. Of course it is possible to have
pension reforms where the elderly are partly compensated. Such scenarios will not change the
general conclusion from our analysis, however, i.e. that choices on the implementations of a
reform policy in one country unavoidably spills over to other countries.
4 Pareto-improving pension reform
In this section we analyse the international spillover eﬀects of a pension reform in the PAYG
country in case there is scope for a Pareto improvement, due to a distortionary PAYG tax.
According to equation (1) we model the excess burden as a (quadratic) loss of tax revenue,
i.e. zP = τP − (τP)2, so (τP
t )2 is wasted. We start from the Pareto neutral pension reform
scenario of the previous section. So the government compensates the elderly at the time of
16the reform completely, and then from t = 1 onwards imposes an extra tax on the pensioners
to pay the interest obligations on the debt in order to keep debt per capita constant. The
budget constraint of the government (eq. (4)) changes to:
bP




t )2) − τB
t (20)
As argued earlier, we assume that the debt tax on the elderly, τB
t , does not imply an excess
burden, as, given the labour-supply motivation for the excess burden, the elderly do not
supply labour.
The change in the capital-labour ratio
In principle the capital-accumulation equation looks the same as equation (16). However, we
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∂π . This implies
that ft = (1 − 2τP)gt instead of ft = gt from t = 1 onwards. The linearised equation for





















In Appendix B.3 we show that in case there is an excess burden, the capital-labour ratio
increases at t = 1 instead of staying constant. This in turn leads to higher wages and savings,
so that the capital-labour ratio continues to increase. We also show this in Figure 15 in
Appendix C.3. The intuition behind this result is that when PAYG taxes induce an excess
burden, abolishing (part of) the PAYG system leads to eﬃciency gains, so that the capital-
labour ratio actually rises, instead of staying constant (as was the case in Section 3.2).
The change in consumption and utility
In Figures 18 and 19 we can see that both consumption of the young and old-age consumption
increase. The main reason for this is that the higher capital-labour ratio results in higher
wages and savings. It is then obvious that this reform leads to a Pareto improvement in the
17PAYG country. This can indeed be seen in Figure 16, all generations get a higher utility9. In
the funded country, however, only consumption of the working people increases (see Figure
20). The elderly in the non-reforming country get less consumption possibilities (see Figure
21), mainly because the interest rate decreases after an increase in kt. For the generation born
at the time of the reform consumption when young does not change, while they can consume
less at their old-age. This necessarily implies that this generation loses from the pension
reform in the other country (see Figure 17). All later generations in country F gain from the
pension reform in country P. So the pension reform in the country with the PAYG pension
scheme does not lead to a Pareto improvement in the funded country. There is one generation
that is hurt by the pension reform in the PAYG country, while in the PAYG country itself all
generations gain from the reform.
5 Concluding remarks
Currently, in many countries with an extensive pay-as-you-go (PAYG) ﬁnanced public pension
system reforms are considered to ﬁnance a larger part of the future pension beneﬁts by
accumulated funds. A central conclusion emerging from our paper is that in a common
capital market the eﬀects of such a pension reform in a PAYG country spills over to countries
with a fully funded pension system. In Europe, e.g., diﬀerences in ﬁnancing methods of
pension systems abound. For instance, countries like Germany and Italy have extensive
PAYG-ﬁnanced parts in their pension system, while in the UK and the Netherlands the
larger part of the pension beneﬁts are ﬁnanced out of accumulated assets. The message of
our paper is that the latter countries cannot insulate themselves from the eﬀects of reform
measures in the former countries. In the European pension debate these spillover eﬀects of
pension reform have not been an issue till now, as far as we know. Yet, the consequences of
pension reform in a PAYG country can be rather adverse for a funded country as we have
shown in this paper. Some key results illustrate this.
First, consider the case where the PAYG country compensates the elderly during the transition
9The explanation for the diﬀerence between closed and open economies is exactly the same as the one in
Section 3.1.
18phase, and the PAYG system is Pareto eﬃcient. The introduction of public debt, necessary
to ﬁnance the compensation during the transition phase of the reform, will lead to crowding
out of the capital stock in both the PAYG and the funded country, as soon as one generation
is allowed to gain during the transition. As a result, future generations in both types of
countries will lose under this reform policy.
Second, if a PAYG country reforms its public pension system such that their own future
generations gain, then, although future generations in the funded country gain as well, the
distribution of consumption between young and old individuals at a certain time will change
at the expense of old individuals. In the funded country the elderly will even consume less in
absolute amounts after the reform. Although the deterioration of old-age consumption is the
result of free choice by individuals in the funded country, the resulting consumption allocation
between young and old individuals might not be desirable from a societal point of view.
Third, we have shown that if excess burdens in tax collection enable a Pareto-improving
pension reform in the PAYG country, during the transition phase some initial generations in
the funded country might suﬀer a loss under the reform nevertheless. In other words, a reform
policy that appears to be Pareto improving for the PAYG country considered separately, does
not have to be Pareto improving after taking into account the international spillover eﬀects.
Obviously, our model has oversimpliﬁed the real world in many ways, and the issue of spillover
eﬀects of pension reform merit further study in especially larger and more applied models. Yet,
we think that our central result, i.e. that pension reform in PAYG countries can have adverse
eﬀects on the welfare of some generations, or some type of individuals in funded countries
will remain to stand out even in a more general model. The obvious policy conclusion from
our model is, therefore, that in a common market like the EU, pension reform should not be
decided upon in isolation by separate member countries, but requires some coordination or
even centralisation of decision making.
19A Derivation ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation capital-labour ra-
tio
In this appendix we derive the ﬁrst-order diﬀerence equation for the evolution of the capital
labour ratio given in equation (14). Linearising the capital-accumulation equation (11) with


































































































with ∆ ≡ 2(2 + ρ) −
(1+ρ)zPf00(k)









Filling in these two last expressions into equation (27) we obtain equation (14).
20B Change in kt at t = 1
In this appendix we show that the pension reform where there is full compensation and the
extra tax introduced to ﬁnance the interest obligations on the debt is levied on the elderly
does not lead to a change in the capital-labour ratio in the standard case (B.1) and leads to
an increase in the capital-labour ratio in case there is an excess burden (B.3). Moreover, we
show that as soon as τB
t is levied on the young in the standard case, there is crowding out of
capital (B.2).
B.1 Compensation: tax levied on the future old
Using equations (17) and (18) into equation (16) we can show that with this pension reform


































Noting that f1 = g0, it is easy to verify that ∂k1
∂π = 0. And when this is the case for t = 1,
this holds for all following periods. So indeed the capital-labour ratio stays contant with this
pension reform scenario.
21B.2 Compensation: tax levied on the future young













The only diﬀerence with the previous pension reform is that τB
t is not introduced yet. This







So we know that as soon as τB
t is levied on the future young, the capital-labour ratio decreases
at t = 1. A lower capital-labour ratio leads to lower wages and from t = 1 onwards the working
people have to start paying τB
t , so that the capital-labour ratio continues to decrease.
B.3 Pareto-improving pension reform
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A higher capital-labour ratio at t = 1 leads to higher wages, so that the capital-labour ratio
continues to increase.
22C Simulations
The graphs in this appendix are based on simulations where half of the PAYG system is
privatised, that is, from t = 1 onwards both the contributions and the beneﬁts fall with
50% permanently10. Moreover, we used the following production function, f(kt) = k0.3
t and
assumed that ρ = 0 and δ = 0.
C.1 Reform without compensation
Figure 1: Change in kt


















Figure 2: Change in UP
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Figure 3: Change in UF
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10The results do not qualitatively change when the PAYG system is totally privatised.
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24C.2 Reform with compensation
Figure 8: Change in kt


















Figure 9: Change in UP
t
















Figure 10: Change in UF
t














25Figure 11: Change in c
y,P
t


















Figure 12: Change in c
o,P
t















Figure 13: Change in c
y,F
t




















Figure 14: Change in c
o,F
t















26C.3 Pareto-improving pension reform
Figure 15: Change in kt

















Figure 16: Change in UP
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